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9]COMMENTS
CONDEMNATION PROCEDURE-AN ARGUMENT FOR REFOR1M-
"A learned study in 1931 reported that [within the United States] there were
269 different methods of judicial condemnation in different classes of cases, and
56 methods of nonjudicial or administrative procedure. Certainly the number
has not decreased since that time."' This plethora of procedure has under-
standable origins. Such was the influence of early corporation law that, in
response to the land acquisition needs of private and municipal corporations,
the state devised methods geared to the demands of the particular condemner.2
The continued existence of these methods, without needed change,e 3 may be
ascribed to several factors-the public remains largely unaffected; - the in-
tricacies of condemnation practice combine with sheer volume to confound bar
and civic organizations;5 inertia exists among those groups particularly quali-
fied to cope with the problem.6 The result is that procedure, no less important
than the substantive law, has not in fact kept pace with substantive law de-
velopments. 7 Indeed one author characterized the situation as "an attempted
production of artificial earth satellites with horse-and-bugzy technology." At
the same time, municipal improvement activities have assumed and will con-
tinue to assume stunning proportions. 9 Such activities can only be implemented
through condemnation. This comment will explore the procedure within the
State of New York, indicate weaknesses, and make suggestions for improve-
ment.
RIGHT TO CONDEIN
The right to acquire land for public use, an attribute inhering in the sov-
ereign,'0 is restricted only by the constitutional mandates of just compensa-
' Editors Note: Although the present comment is reflective of the views of its author-,
it should be noted that the Fordham Law Review has been assisting the Committee on
Real Property of the Association of the Bar of the City of NLW York in an inve:tigation
of the condemnation laws of New York State.
1. Clark, The Proposed Condemnation Rule, 10 Ohio St. LJ. 1, 4 (1949).
2. Wasserman, Procedure in Eminent Domain, 11 Mercer L. Rev. 245, 257 (19fO).
3. See, e.g., Panuch, Building a Better New York 102-03 (1960) (Final Report to Mayor
Robert F. Wagner by the Special Adviser on Housing and Urban Renewal).
4. Goldstein, Condemnation Procedure in the State of New York, 17 N.YS.B.A. Bull.
230 (1945).
5. Wallstein, Report on Law and Procedure in Condemnation 5 (1932) (applicable to
proceedings brought by the City of New York).
6. Ibid.
7. Kratoreil & Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concepts, 42 Calif. L. Rev. 596,
604 (1954).
S. Wasserman, supra note 2, at 247.
9. In the area of public housing alone, completion of programs now under study will
vest in the New York City Housing Authority properties valued at two billion dollars.
Panuch, op. cit. supra note 3, at 49. See also Searles & Raphael, Current Trends in the Law
of Condemnation, 27 Fordham L. Rev. 529-30 (1959).
10. 11 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations § 32.11 (3d cd. 1950). This right can be
exercised only if conferred by the legislature expressly or by neccssary implication. 1 Lewi,
Eminent Domain § 371 (3d ed. 1909). Authority by implication, however, is more readily
drawn in favor of public than private corporations organized for profit. Ibid. See Note, 29
Fordham L. Rev. 390 (1960).
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tion.11 The New York Legislature has delegated the authority to condemn to
cities, 12 towns, 13 villages,' 4 state' and municipal agencies,' 0 public17 and certain
private corporations' 8 which serve a public purpose. Indeed, under limited cir-
cumstances, even private citizens may initiate condemnation proceedings,' 9 and
municipalities are authorized to condemn and sell at public auction.20 Cities
are free to draft their own procedure provided it is consistent with the state con-
stitution and state policy as reflected by statute and judicial interpretation. 2
Not only are the grants of power voluminous, but in many instances the pro-
cedure is redundant. 22 Moreover, where procedual steps could be uniform, they
differ.2 3 This volume of procedure, its prolixity and unnecessary variation, have
caused the uninitiated to regard the practice of condemnation law as a science.
24
The field remains the realm of the "specialist."
STATUTORY PROCEDURES
The pertinent language of the New York Constitution25 gives rise to two
distinct land acquisition procedures. Condemnation pursuant to administra-
tive proceeding uses the courts only for the purpose of determining compensa-
tion, while in the judicial proceeding all questions are determined within the
courts.
26
A. Administrative Proceedings
Commonly referred to as acquisition by appropriation, the administrative pro-
ceeding is in most respects typified by Section 30 of the Highway Law.2 7 As
therein provided, the superintendent of public works causes a map and descrip-
11. N.Y. Const. art. 1, § 7(a), provides: "Private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation." North Carolina appears to be the only state without such
a provision. 11 McQuillan, op. cit. supra note 10, § 32.10. In that state, however, compensa-
tion is a mandate of case law. Phillips v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 130 N.C. 313, 41 S.E. 1022
(1902).
12. N.Y. Gen. City Law § 20(2).
13. N.Y. Town Law § 64(2).
14. N.Y. Village Law § 290.
15. N.Y. Correc. Law § 21; N.Y. H'way Law § 30.
16. N.Y. Rapid Transit Law § 50(a).
17. See, e.g., N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 533(4).
18. N.Y. R.R. Law § 17.
19. N.Y. H'way Law § 199.
20. N.Y. Munic. Law § 72-k. See art. 15, N.Y. Munic. Law, added by Sess. Laws 1961,
ch. 402, which has recodified the urban renewal sections.
21. N.Y. Const. art. 9, § 12.
22. See, e.g., N.Y. H'way Law §§ 29, 30, 347.
23. See, e.g., N.Y. Correc. Law § 21; N.Y. H'way Law § 30.
24. Wallstein, op. cit. supra note 5, at x.
25. N.Y. Const. art. 1, § 7.
26. N.Y. Const. art. 1, § 7(b), provides: "When private property shall be taken for any
public use, the compensation to be made therefor, when such compensation is not made by
the state, shall be ascertained by a jury, or by the supreme court without a jury, but not
with a referee other than an official referee, or by not less than three commissioners ap-
pointed by a court of record, as shall be prescribed by law."
27. N.Y. H'way Law § 30.
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tion to be prepared indicating the property deemed necessary for state highway
purposes.2 8 After the map and a description of the property is first filed in
the office of the department of public works and a certified copy of each is
filed with the department of state,- O the appropriate state agency may enter
upon and take possession of the property. 0 Upon the superintendent of public
works filing a copy of the map and description with the county clerk or register
of the county in which the property is located, title vests in the people of
New York.31 A copy of the description and map is sent to the attorney general,
who, in turn, certifies to the superintendent of public works the names of
those haxing an interest in the property. After filing and recording a notice
of appropriation in the clerk's office of the county wherein the property is sit-
uated, the superintendent serves upon those named a copy of the map and
description and notice of appropriation. 32 At or after the vesting of title, the
owner may be ejected upon forty days notice.P3 At this point it is well to note
that the state may enter upon the property before the owner is given legal
notice3 4 The right to notice applies only when the owner has actual, rather
than constructive occupancy of the premises.33 Claims for the value of prop-
erty appropriated and damages caused thereby may be adjusted by the super-
intendent. If adjustment fails, the superintendent may agree with the owner
to pay sinty per cent of the amount he considers the value of the claim 0c l In
the absence of agreement, the owner may, of course, file a claim with the
court of claims,37 each claim being separately tried before a single judge.3 3
The United States Supreme Court has held such procedure not violative of
either the fifth 9 or fourteenth40 amendments, provided adequate compensation
is assured. The public faith of the sovereign is deemed such assurance.4 ' Unless
required by the state constitution, payment is not a condition precedent to the
taking of the property.N 4 2 The New York State Constitution imposes no restrictions
23. N.Y. H'way Law § 30(3).
29. N.Y. H'way Law § 30(4).
30. N.Y. H'way Law § 30(5).
31. N.Y. H'way Law § 30(6).
32. N.Y. H'wav Law § 30(9).
33. N.Y. R'way Law § 30(12).
34. Goldstein, supra note 4, at 233.
35. Weitzner v. Stichman, 64 N.Y.S.2d 40 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 271 App.
Div. 255, 64 N.Y.S.2d 50, reargument denied, 271 App. Div. 774, 64 N.Y.S.2d 926 (Lt Dep't
1946), aff'd mem., 296 N.Y. 907, 72 N.E.2d 625 (1947).
36. N.Y. H'way Law § 30(13).
37. N.Y. H'way Law § 30(14).
33. Goldstein, supra note 4, at 233.
39. Crozier v. Krupp, 244 U.S. 290 (1912).
40. Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 203 (1945); Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 3M0 (1S95).
41. "[Tjhe duty to provide for payment of compensation may be adequately fulfilled
by an assumption on the part of government of the duty to make prompt payment of the
ascertained compensation-that is, by the pledge, either ePaprezly or by necc:ary implica-
tion, of the public good faith to that end." Crozier v. Krupp, 224 U.S. 290, 30e (1912).
42. People v. Adirondack Ry., 160 N.Y. 225, 54 N.E. 6S9 (1,S9), aff'd, 176 U.S. 335
(1900). Alabama typifies those jurisdictions in which payment must precede ting. A1a.
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upon payment and the taking may therefore precede compensation. Nor need
the owner be given notice of the acquisition before entry4" by the state agency.
However, if the condemner exceeds his authority, the statute authorizing condem-
nation affords no protection to the state agent so acting and an injunction will
lie. 44
Analysis of Procedure
Legislation providing for acquisition through administrative proceedings is
in many instances redundant. Moreover, the variance in procedure has some-
thing less than a reasonable basis. The New York Highway Law contains
three sections setting forth the entire procedure pursuant to which the super-
intendent of public works may acquire land by appropriation. When condemn-
ing for thruway45 or national defense purposes,40 the appropriation procedure
is mandatory. Yet, when land is taken for state highways,4 7 appropriation is
an alternative procedure. In each instance, however, the procedure is the same.
The superintendent is also empowered to acquire land for canal 48 and flood
control 49 purposes. In both cases the procedure is spelled out and each dupli-
cates the procedure set forth in the Highway Law.
When, however, this officer acquires land for public works,5 the procedure
differs in three aspects, though remaining basically similar. Under the Highway
Law, the superintendent serves upon the landowner, in addition to a copy
of the map and description, a notice of appropriation. This notice sets forth
the dates of the filing of the map and description in the office of the depart-
ment of state and county clerk. It also informs the owner that title to the in-
terest being acquired vested in the state upon filing in the last mentioned of-
fice.51 The Public Works procedure, on the other hand, requires only that notice of
filing of papers be given. 52 That the owner is aware of the full impact of this
notice is doubtful at best.
A second variation is contained in the provisions allowing ejectment. Statutes
corresponding to the Highway Law permit the owner's removal at or after the
vesting of title but upon forty days notice.5 3 Upon ten days notice to quit, the
Public Works procedure permits ejectment at or after thirty days from service of
Const. art. 1, § 23, provides in pertinent part: "[Blut just compensation shall, in all cases,
be first made to the owner." See also Ex parte Lance, 267 Ala. 639, 103 So. 2d 753 (1958).
43. Cf. People v. Adirondack Ry., supra note 42, at 237-39, 54 N.E. at 692-93.
44. Although the state is not subject to litigation at the insistence of an individual, sover-
eign immunity will not cloak the illegality of an official act. The complaint, however, must
state a cause of action against the defendants individually. Pauchogue Land Corp v. Long
Island State Park Comm'n, 243 N.Y. 15, 152 N.E. 451 (1926).
45. N.Y. H'way Law § 347.
46. N.Y. H'way Law § 29.
47. N.Y. H'way Law § 30.
48. N.Y. Canal Law § 40.
49. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 1307 (McKinney 1949).
50. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 7272(1)-(22) (McKinney 1953) [hereinafter referred to in
text as Public Works].
51. N.Y. H'way Law § 30(9).
52. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 7272(10) (McKinney 1953).
53. See, e.g., N.Y. Canal Law § 40(11).
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map, description and notice of filing.54 The difference is seemingly insignificant;
but because the landowner might be unaware of the vesting of title, the varia-
tion might well prove a harsh one.
The last, but most significant difference is in the procedure for settlement of
claims. Pursuant to Section 30(13) of the Highway Law, the superintendent
is empowered, if the claim cannot be adjusted, to agree with the owner to pay
up to sixty per cent of the amount the superintendent considers to be the value
of the claim. There is no such provision in the Public Works procedure. 5 From
the landowner's point of view, the purpose of the appropriation can malke little
difference. Fear of being without compensation pending the prosecution of
his claim with the court of claims might well induce the owner to accept any
but the most arbitrary offer. 0 Clearly, the owner whose property is taken de-
serves better treatment.57 At this point, it should be noted that the following
correspond in detail to all relevant provisions of the Public Works procedure: the
Correction Law,5 8 the Agriculture and MKarkets Law,19 and the 'Military Law 0.c
In one instance the legislature has made what appears to be an unusual
effort to make its intention clear. Section 6485 of the Unconsolidated Laws
allows the Port of New York Authority to acquire land pursuant to Chapter
S02, Section 15, of the Laws of New York, 1947.1 This procedure appears in
the Unconsolidated Laws and applies to condemnation for air terminal pur-
poses 2  At the time section 64S5 was enacted, the authority had access to an
alternative procedure for any land acquisition need.c3 The air terminal and
alternative procedures are precisely the same. The redundancy would seem
to be without reason.
The use of the administrative procedure in its present form, at least, appears
to be unwarranted. Appraisal is a prerequisite to the condemner's efforts to
take property. There seems, therefore, to be no valid reason why the owner
should not be paid the appraised value pending final determination of com-
pensation. It would further appear that satisfactory methods could be estab-
lished in respect to notice and ejectment without unduly sacrificing the effi-
ciency of this proceeding.
54. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 7272(13) (McKinney 1953).
55. N.Y. UnconsoL Laws § 7272(14) (McKinney 1953).
56. It has been stated that twenty years experience with the federal admintrative pro-
ceeding, Declaration of Taking Act, 46 Stat. 1421 (1931), 40 U.S.C. §§ 258(a)-58(e) (1953),
shows that less than 5% of the owners affected filed claims. 43 Nw. U.L. Rev. 434, 435 n.6
(1953). It must be realized, however, that the federal proccdure allov.s the landowner im-
mediately to withdraw the appraised value.
57. This is particularly true as respects the owner whose land is taken for a state fair.
N.Y. Agric. & Mlkts. Law § 27(1).
58. N.Y. Correc. Law § 21.
59. N.Y. Agric. & Dk~ts. Law § 27.
60. N.Y. Till. Law § 177.
61. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 64S5 (McKinney 1960).
62. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 6615 (McKinney 1953).
63. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 6561 (McKinney 1953).
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B. Judicial Proceedings
The General Condemnation Law,64 which controls unless there is a provision
to the contrary 5 and which supplements where applicable,00 best illustrates the
judicial procedure. The proceeding is initiated by the presentation of a petition
to the supreme court or county court . T A copy of the petition and notice of
time and place of presentation must be served upon the owner prior to such
presentation." The owner may interpose an answer putting in issue the peti-
tion's allegations. 69 If the petitioner prevails, judgment is entered declaring
the property to be necessary for the public use.70 This judgment entitles the
condemner to possession upon payment of compensation. The court thereupon
appoints three commissioners of appraisal 7' who, after viewing the premises
and taking proof, make an award. 72 The court may confirm or set aside the
award. If set aside, a rehearing is had before the same or new commissioners
Upon confirmation, the court enters a final order stating that the condemner
may take possession, payment being a condition precedent. 7a Either party may
appeal to the appellate division.74 The appellate division may then direct a
new appraisal before the same or new commissioners. This report of the com-
missioners is final and conclusive upon all parties concerned. 75 There Is no
right of appeal to the court of appeals. 76 In the event necessity dictates that
64. N.Y. Condem. Law §§ 1-29.
65. In the Matter of Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 217 N.Y. 61, 111 N.E. 658 (1916), cert. denied,
251 U.S. 537 (1919).
66. County of Orange v. Ellsworth, 98 App. Div. 275, 90 N.Y. Supp. 576 (2d Dep't
1904).
67. N.Y. Condem. Law § 4.
68. N.Y. Condem. Law § 5.
69. N.Y. Condem. Law § 9.
70. If judgment is entered against the petitioner, he may appeal to the appellate division.
N.Y. Condem. Law § 20. The landowner, however, has no right of appeal at this time.
New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Smith, 269 App. Div. 725, 54 N.Y.S.2d 287 (4th Dep't
1954) (memorandum decision). This is so even though the owner contends that the order
extends petitioner's authority beyond statutory limits. Gilson v. Lambert, 282 App. Dlv.
1046, 126 N.Y.S.2d 341 (2d Dep't 1953) (memorandum decision).
71. N.Y. Condem. Law § 13.
72. N.Y. Condem. Law § 14.
73. N.Y. Condem. Law § 15.
74. N.Y. Condem. Law § 19
75. N.Y. Condem. Law § 21. New York Cent. R.R. v. Harrison, 279 App. Div. 341,
109 N.Y.S.2d 572 (4th Dep't 1952), in dictum, stated that an appeal will lie from this report
if it can be shown that the commissioners were biased or arbitrarily refused to follow a
proper rule in determining damages. This is at odds with authority. Prior cases state the
proper procedure is by motion to set aside the award. In the Matter of City of New York,
267 N.Y. 64, 78, 195 N.E. 685, 690 (1935) ; In the Matter of So. Blvd. R.R., 141 N.Y. 532,
536-38, 36 N.E. 600, 601 (1894). It should be noted that there are procedures in the State
of New York whereby an appeal can be taken to the court of appeals. See, e.g., New York,
N.Y., Administrative Code § B15 - 26.0 (1957).
76. The Condemnation Law does not provide for such appeal. The courts, therefore, are
bound. In the Matter of Bd. of Transp., 272 N.Y. 52, 55, 4 N.E.2d 214, 215 (1936).
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the public interest is best served by immediate possession, the condemner may
enter at any stage of the proceedings upon depositing a sum fixed by the courtY7t
The owner, though dispossessed, is without access to the deposit. It should also
be noted that the appeal does not stay the condemner's proceedings unless the
court so directs.7s
Analysis of Procedure
The procedure set forth above would appear effective. It is, however, not
without defect. The petition creates too many justiciable issues. Among other
items to be included is an allegation that the property is necessary for public
use.79 Quite obviously, most owners will not be enthusiastic with the prospect
of condemnation. This allegation affords the owner a convenient method of
venting his spleen, thereby unnecessarily delaying the proceedings. That the
owner be protected from an arbitrary taking is an obvious necessity. It is also
clear that remedies are available should such a contingency occurP0 But a
procedure arming an owner with the means unnecessarily to delay condemna-
tion, does a disservice to the public, on the one hand; and on the other, fur-
nishes a strong argument for the condemner seeking a "quick taking" statute.
A second defect is that the provision permits the owner to be ejected without
having access to the deposit. This possibility does not create an atmosphere
conducive to meaningful negotiation. It is a club with which the condemner
should not be armed.
Perhaps the most difficult problem is the determination of compensation. In
this respect, the procedure relating to the appointment of commissioners is not
desirable. It is specified that they be competent.8 ' "Competent" has been
construed as meaning honest, unbiased and impartial. - These qualifications
are not sufficient. The practicability of having a jury constituted as the tribunal
to determine compensation has been much criticizedL 3 Basically, the jury is
without experience and therefore entirely dependent upon the conflicting views
of the expert witnesses, in short, easily confused. The present system is, in
effect, a jury of three. Because they are but three, will they be any less con-
fused?
PROCEDURAL VARIATIONS
Other statutes setting forth judicial procedure within the State of New York
differ in many respects from the General Condemnation Law. The Highway
77. N.Y. Condem. Law § 24.
78. N.Y. Condem. Law § 19.
79. N.Y. Condem. Law § 4(3).
80. See note 44 supra. See also N.Y. Munic. Law § 51, which allows a landowner to
enjoin the proceedings of any agent or officer acting for or on behalf of a political sub-
division of the state.
S1. N.Y. Condem. Law § 13.
82. City of Plattsburg v. Kellogg, 254 App. Div. 433, 459, S. N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1013 (3d
Dep't 1938).
83. Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, Proposcd Rule To Govern Con-
demnation Cases in the District Courts of the United Statez, 7 F.R.D. -03, 511 (1947);
Graubart, Theory Versus Practice in the Trial of Condemnation Cases, 26 Pa. B. A. Q. 3-6, 49
(1954); Wasserman, Procedure in Eminent Domain, 11 Mercer L. Rev. 245, 279-S2 (1960).
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Law requires that the petition, in addition to the prayer for relief, contain only
a property description.84 Other sections allow the condemner, as a matter of
course, to take possession after judgment.8 5 The Village Law compels the
commissioners of appraisal to consider and to offset the value of any benefits
or advantages to the property resulting from an alteration or improvement.Y'
Under an alternative proceeding, the same law permits the village board of
trustees to determine whether compensation should be ascertained by the
supreme court without a jury or by commissioners of estimate appointed by
that court or the county court as the board shall determine.87 The Conserva-
tion Law presents an interesting departure. It states that if acquisition is not
completed within eighteen months after the first publication of notice of appli-
cation, any interested person may apply to the court for a discontinuance of
the proceedings.88
The variations noted illustrate legislative indecision. The needs of land-
owner, condemner and the public remain constant, i.e., a swift but equitable
determination. The existing procedures, diverse as they are, can not possibly
be equally efficient.
NEw YORK CITY
The City of New York, expressly excluded from the provisions of the Con-
demnation Law,8 9 condemns pursuant to the Administrative Code.9 0 The code
procedure requires publication of a notice of intention to make application to
condemn, 91 after which the corporation counsel presents a petition to the
supreme court.92 Upon filing the petition and proof of publication, the court
enters an order granting the applicationY3 The city at this time may take
possession of the propertyY4 The corporation counsel then causes to be pub-
84. N.Y. H'way Law § 120.
85. N.Y. H'way Law § 250(5); N.Y. Town Law § 64(2).
86. N.Y. Village Law §§ 149, 159(1).
87. N.Y. Village Law § 312.
88. N.Y. Conserv. Law § 760. See also N.Y. H'way Law § 250(5). It is therein pro-
vided that if compensation is not paid within one year after its determination title is re-
vested in the owner, who may sue in the court of claims for damages resulting from the
condemner's possession.
89. N.Y. Condem. Law § 27. Although the language of the General Condemnation Law
appears all encompasing, it is difficult to find a condemner who must proceed according to
its provisions.
90. New York, N.Y., Administrative Code §§ B15-1.0 to -41.0 (1957) [hereinafter cited
as Administrative Code). This comment will not touch upon excess lands condemnation
procedure, Administrative Code §§ C15-1.0 to -10.0; acquisition of property outside the city
for street closings, Administrative Code §§ D15-1.0 to -27.0; or street closing procedure,
Administrative Code §§ E15-1.0 to -28.0.
91. Administrative Code § B15-7.0.
92. Administrative Code § B15-8.0.
93. Administrative Code § B15-9.0.
94. This is true in a capital project proceeding. Administrative Code § B15-36.0. In an
assessable improvement proceeding, the corporation counsel is thereafter required to file a
damage map. Administrative Code § B15-10.0 Title vests upon such filing. Administrative
Code § B15-36.0.
[Vol. 29
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lished notice to file claims.Y After receipt of the claims he serves on the
claimants notice of the time and place at which proof of title will be received.
After a hearing limited to the proof, the corporation counsel serves on all
parties appearing a note of issueY7 The proceeding then moves to trial where
the court, without a jurvOs determines compensation and, if necessary, title
disputes. After xvewing " the property and hearing testimony, the court enters
a tentative decree estimating compensation.' -  The corporation counsel pub-
lishes a notice permitting interested parties to file objections to the decree.10 '
After hearing objections and amending the tentative decree, the court enters
the final decree. 10 2 Appeals from the final decree may be taken to the appel-
late division °3 and the court of appeals, 1'0 the appeals staying the proceed-
ings only as to the property affected. Provision has been made for payrent in
advance of the determination of compensation. The Board of Estimate may
authorize payment of up to seventy-five per cent of assessed valuation less
liens and encumbrances of record.10 5
Analysis of Procedure
The order granting the application to condemn is not appealable. Thus
owners who appear to challenge the proceedings are placed in an unenviable
position. By the time appeal is taken from the final decree it is possible that
the premises will have been demolished.'" A practical solution'0 7 to this problem
would appear to be via a taxpayer's suit to obtain an injunction restraining the
proceedings of the condemner.'(' By giving a res judicata effect to the decision on
the injunction, there would be no reason why the final decree in the main action
should stay the condemner's proceedings.
The provision for advance payment is unsatisfactory and in need of immedi-
ate attention. Even assuming payment is authorized, the amount received
cannot exceed seventy-five per cent of the assessed valuation, though it could
be anything less.
95. Administrative Code § B15-11.0.
96. Administrative Code § B1S-12.0(a). Title disputes are determined by the court upon
trial of the proceedings. Administrative Code § B15-12.0(b).
97. Administrative Code § B15-14.0.
93. Administrative Code § B1S-1.0(2).
99. Administrative Code § B1S-15.0.
100. Administrative Code § B15-19.0.
101. Administrative Code § B15-22.0. Upon the written consent of the corporation
counsel and ov.er, the tentative decree, and filing of objections thereto, may be waivcd.
Administrative Code § B15-23.1 (Supp. 1960).
102. Administrative Code § B1S-23.0.
103. Administrative Code § B15-25.0.
104. Administrative Code § B15-26.0.
105. Administrative Code § B15-29.0.
106. Abberman, Condemnation and the Courts, 12 New York County Lawyers A.B. Bull.
102, 104-05 (1954).
107. Id. at 105.
10. N.Y. MIunic. Law § 51. See, e.g., Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 3O N.Y. 73, 115 X.E2d 659
(1953) ; Denihan Enterprises, Inc. v. O'Dwyer, 302 N.Y. 451, 99 N.E2d 235 (1951).
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New York City dispensed with commissioners of appraisal after finding this
system replete with waste, incompetence and extravagance. 00 That the court,
without jury, is any more efficient is doubtful. "Perhaps in no other field of law
is the trial judge so completely helpless to learn the truth.""10 Because appraisal
is largely a matter of opinion, it is felt that an interchange of views should be
made possible."' Indeed, disenchantment with the commission system seems
to lie in the fact that the commissioners were unqualified. A panel of experts
would not be easily misled by the insinuations of counsel and the expert
witness. 112
It has been held that published notice of the hearing on compensation is
violative of due process if personal service is possible. 113 The Administrative
Code provides for service upon those filing claims and proof of title. Notice to
file claims, however, is published in the City Record only."14 A clear mandate
requiring personal service would allay all doubt concerning this procedure.
PROCEDURE IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Both the federal government and the State of Wisconsin have condemnation
provisions which New York might profitably emulate. The Federal Declaration
of Taking Act" 5 is roughly similar to, though far more equitable than, the New
York administrative procedure. The federal act requires a deposit of the esti-
mated compensation as a prerequisite to the vesting of title. Not only does
the owner have access thereto, but the court, upon filing of the declaration of
taking, fixes the time and place for the owner to surrender possession. If com-
pensation, as finally determined, exceeds the amount withdrawn, judgment is
entered against the United States." 0
The State of Wisconsin has recently amended its procedure and has incor-
porated several features worthy of note. The condemner must make an appraisal
and in so doing confer with the owner. 1 7 Thereafter, the parties negotiate for
purchase." 8 If the resulting offer is not accepted, the owner has, after com-
109. Wallstein, Report on Law and Procedure in Condemnation 11 (1932) (applicable
to proceedings brought by the City of New York).
110. Id. at v.
111. Wasserman, supra note 83, at 281.
112. Abberman, supra note 106, at 107. The interplay between these two is best Il-
lustrated by the following: "The choice of the right kind of expert involves a plain con-
sideration of money in the attorney's pocket, and a claimant's expert would have to be
more than human if his approach to his task of valuation were not colored by the knowl-
edge that his immediate and future employment depended upon his being able to produce the
desired result." Wallstein, op. cit. supra note 109, at ix.
113. Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
114. Administrative Code § B15-11.0.
115. 46 Stat. 1421 (1931), 40 U.S.C. §§ 258(a)-58(e) (1958).
116. It is interesting to note that there is no provision for the converse. In an analogous
situation, Wisconsin provides for both contingencies. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 32.05(9) (b) (Supp.
1961).
117. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 32.05(2) (Supp. 1961).
118. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 32.05(2a) (Supp. 1961).
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pletion of serxice, forty days within which to contest the taking.110 An award,
at least equal to the offer, is made available to the ow-ner,2 and the retention
of this award is not a bar to an appeal for greater compensation. 121 County
condemnation commissioners, who are appointed by the county court for three
year terms, staggered to insure e.xperience, -12 2 may decide the issue of com-
pensation on appeal. 123 Provision has been made for judgment over if such
determination differs from the basic award.'- ' Appeal from the commissioners'
award may be taken to the circuit court with a jury trial, unless the jury be
waived by both parties, 125 and thence to the state supreme court.'O
This procedure would be more efficient if the commissioners could not be
bypassed, and appeal to the circuit court without a jury be allowed. A basic-
ally sound idea, that of county commissioners, is relegated to relative insignifi-
cance by allowing a jury to pass on their determination, on the one hand, or
permitting such determination to be circumvented on the other. Surely an
award resulting from the deliberation oif experienced appraisers is entitled to
more weight than that of a jury. Apparently Wisconsin, like the City of New
York, feels that just compensation cannot be determined without review ad
infinitum. This approach is unsound. Much of the state's procedure, however, is
desirable. Negotiation prior to appraisal and offer allows the owner to point
out features and considerations that otherwise might escape the attention of
the condemner. Such negotiations, when coupled with an available deposit,
create an atmosphere making an equitable offer less remote. A revised system
of determining compensation and appeal would give Wisconsin a procedure that
could profitably be emulated by any jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
A satisfactory condemnation procedure must equitably and efficiently accom-
plish the vesting of title and ascertainment of compensation. Title cannot effec-
tively vest if the petition encourages contest and consequent delay. Delay is
a formidable weapon. The owner should not be so armed. To this end it is
submitted that the petition be simple and concise. From the order granting the
petition no appeal should lie, but the condemner should be allowed to enter and
take possession. If an owner be aggrieved, let him pursue his remedy without
the condemnation proceedings. 2 7 A necessary corollary is that an award be im-
mediately available to the owner. In this regard a procedure similar to Wiscon-
sin's, including negotiation prior to appraisal and offer, is recommended.
119. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 32.05(3) (h) (Supp. 1961).
120. 'Wis. Stat. Ann. § 32.05(7) (a) (Supp. 1961).
121. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 32.05(3) (i) (Supp. 1961). The acceptance and retention of any
part of such award does bar an action to contest the taking.
122. Wis. Stat. Ann- § 32.03 (Supp. 1961).
123. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 32.05(9) (a) (Supp. 1961). If the owner elects, he may appeal
directly to the county court. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 32.05(11) (Supp. 1961).
124. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 32.05(9) (b) (Supp. 1961).
125. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 32.05(10) (a) (Supp. 1961).
126. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 32.05(13) (Supp. 1961).
127. The remedy pursuant to N.Y. Munic. Law § 51 remains available.
1961] COMMENTS
